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Critical Theory and Social Work: Historical context and contemporary manifestations 
Introduction  
Throughout its history social work has been influenced by the wider socio-political environment 
within which it is located. From the Charity Organisation Society (COS) and the moral reformers of 
the 19th/20th centuries, the eugenics policies of the early 20th century, the welfarism of the mid-late 
20th century,  to the neoliberal managerialism of the present day. A cursory glance at these 
developments shows the influence of various political ideologies, from the left, right and middle 
ground of British politics. 
In this chapter I want to look at one particular political influence on social welfare, that of ‘critical 
theory’, a set of ideas and practices that developed from those on the left of the political spectrum 
and has subsequently influenced, and been influenced by, other political/theoretical perspectives 
such as postmodernism and poststructuralism. This is not to say that there are not profound 
differences between the aforementioned traditions, merely to say that even in critique, by engaging 
with earlier writers, it helped clarify the thinking of later theorists, even if the conclusions they 
reached were very different. As these theoretical perspectives interacted with the political struggles 
of the day they influenced both the politics of identity and difference, perspectives which paved the 
way for the current popularity within left wing political thought for intersectional politics that seeks 
to understand how various identities intersect and influence the personal and political lives of 
subjects. We now have inter alia critical race theory, critical disability studies, critical psychiatry, 
critical psychology and even, for our purposes, critical social work. Indeed, it would be rare to hear a 
contemporary social or psychological academic state that they considered themselves to be an 
uncritical theorist. 
To illustrate the influence of some of these developments I first give a brief summary of some key 
considerations and terms within critical theory, paying particular attention to the thought a group of 
theorists who became known as the Frankfurt School. This is not that because these writers are 
necessarily the most influential on critical thought, such influences are diverse and wide-ranging. For 
example, it is possible that the thought of those associated with Stuart Hall’s Centre for Cultural 
Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK had more influence on the radical of that time (Hall et 
al. 1978; Hall, 2016). However, my intention is to give those readers unfamiliar with the work of the 
Frankfurt School a basic synopsis and provide further references for more detailed engagement with 
their ideas. This is because whilst most will associate critical theory with the ideas of Marx, who did 
indeed influence the Frankfurt School, relatively fewer will be aware of the ideas of these twentieth 
century social theorists whose work is often summarised as ‘Critical Theory’. 
 I then look at the way such thought challenged some key ideas of liberal thought, particularly 
reason and rationality and how these have been developed by later theorists concerned with 
challenging social injustice. In order to demonstrate this I look at debates within disability and 
mental health in general, and in attempts at challenging stigma in particular. By way of a conclusion I 
discuss some of the implications for social work and social workers. 
What is Critical Theory?1  
In 1923 Felix Weil set up the Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University, more commonly 
known as the Frankfurt School. Its first director was an Austrian economist and historian called Carl 
                                                          
1 How (1993) provides a good introduction to Critical Theory. There are also a number of good online resources 
such as https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/  
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Grunberg but it is more closely associated with his replacement, Max Horkheimer, who took over in 
1930s. The Institute attracted an association of Left wing intellectuals including theorists such as 
Erich Fromm, Franz Neuman, Otto Kirchheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno and Herbert 
Marcuse. Whilst their theories often overlapped, generally along the lines of trying to combine 
Marx’s histrocial materialism with Freudian psychoanalysis, it was only for a sfrieret time, in America 
during the period of the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung (a ‘publication for social progress’) that they 
formed a genuine school.2  
The work developed by the Frankfurt School became known as ‘critical theory’. Whilst writers such 
as Ramsey (2000) claim that critical theory was a codename for Marxism, it would be more accurate 
to view it as an umbrella term to cover the wide ranging but related theoretical work of the 
members of the School. Critical theory has as its goal human liberation, and works ‘to create a world 
which satisfies the needs and powers’ of human beings (Horkheimer 1972, 246). The aim is not only 
to explain but also transform all the circumstances that limit human freedom. For Horkheimer 
(1993), a critical theory of society, ‘has as its object human beings as producers of their own 
historical form of life’ (p. 21). With the rise of fascism and the decline of revolutionary class-
consciousness the work of the Frankfurt School took a pessimistic turn, the prospect of social 
transformation being seen as off the agenda for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the writings of 
the Frankfurt School, in particular that of Adorno and Marcuse, influenced the radical Western 
movements of the 1960s, many of whom in turn influenced the development of critical thinking 
within wider society and also social work. The writings are deep, thought-provoking and also 
problematic but are essential for anyone wishing to understand the development of radical thought 
in the latter part of the twentieth-century.3 
An important concept within critical theory is that of immanent critique. If a society has the potential 
to create a fairer, more just, social system and yet fails to do so then it should be subject to critique 
from within its own walls. The influence on social work can be seen in the radical social work 
movement’s slogan of ‘In and Against the State’ (ref). This emphasised the contradictory aspect of 
state social work in that it acknowledged that it was a profession embedded within the machinery of 
the state but that it also had the potential to challenge and change the values and practices of the 
profession in the pursuit of social justice. Similar criticisms emerged within other disciplines such as 
psychology and psychiatry. In this respect it is worth noting that despite the varied external critiques 
of the psy-professions, many of the most perceptive have been from those trained and/or working in 
the fields (e.g. Szasz, 1961; Thomas, 1997; Johnstone, 2000; Parker, 2007). 
Another important concept is that of praxis, which refers to the ‘theory/practice’ relationship and of 
how social science may serve the goal of social justice. The important point to note is the emphasis 
on theory not being some metaphysical abstraction with guidelines for how we should live and 
intervene in society, but that people’s experiences and subjectivities should influence theoretical 
insights. To put it in common parlance, there are some things you cannot learn from just reading 
books, you also need to interact with others. Oliver and Sapey (2006) give the example of the social 
worker allocated the ‘case’ of a tetraplegic woman. With limited knowledge of the woman’s 
condition or how it affected her life the social worker agreed to spend a full day with the woman, 
from before she got out of bed in the morning to when she got back into it at night. This gave her far 
                                                          
2 Many of the members of the Institute were Jewish and fled to the USA at various points during the 1930s. 
3 My focus is on the earlier generation of critical theorists. However, whilst not essential to my argument the 
work of later writers associated with the school, such as Jurgen Habermas, has also been both highly acclaimed 
and critiqued within social theory and political circles. 
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more insight into the needs of her client than she would have got from reading medical books about 
the causes and ‘cures’ of her condition. 
This move to acknowledging that many users of services are ‘experts by experience’ has helped 
challenge the dominance of professional knowledge. This does not necessarily dismiss the value of 
medical expertise but rather questions its ability to provide certain insights. So, in the above 
example, knowing the medical/genetic causes of tetraplegia, whilst obviously important, is of little 
help in understanding what it is like to confront daily life with it; for that we need experience not 
science. 
Praxis, in ancient Greece, was a way for practical reasoning to lead to wise action, with the moral 
disposition to act truly and rightly. In modern times, this moral or ethical component is usually 
translated as a commitment towards a particular end. With roots in the philosophical work of 
Aristotle the notion of praxis has influenced a range of thinkers from all sides of the political 
spectrum As Karl Marx proclaimed: ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it’ (Marx, 1845, online). For the highly influential educationalist and 
political activist Paulo Freire, praxis is reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it 
(Freire, 1970).  
Rather than, as is often the case, practice is seen as separate from theory, praxis aims to bring 
together practice, reflection, education and research in an integrated whole. One important 
contribution was by Hannah Arendt who, in her book The Human Condition  criticised much of 
Western philosophy for being too preoccupied with the contemplative life (vita contemplativa) and 
neglectful of the active life (vita activa). For Arendt (1958) the implication of this was to miss the 
relevance of philosophical ideas to daily real life. For her, it is our capacity to grapple with and 
analyse  ideas, and engage in active praxis, that is the mark of human uniqueness. 
However, for Horkheimer, it was not a preoccupation with philosophical thought that was the main 
concern, rather it was the lack of reflection within the masses that was the problem. For him, the 
instrumentalism of contemporary society brought about by the commodification and classification 
processes of modernity had turned people into unthinking automatons, looking at the world in 
quantitative as opposed to qualitative terms. The creative, freethinking individual is subsumed by 
the needs of the modern technological age, ‘The substance of individuality itself, to which the idea 
of autonomy was bound, did not survive the process of industrialization’ (Horkheimer, 1941, p.36). 
Consequently, ‘today, man needs factual knowledge, the automaton ability to react correctly, but he 
does not need the quiet consideration of diverse possibilities which presupposes the freedom and 
leisure of choice’ (ibid. p.39).  
Horkheimer may have been writing over 75 years ago but his argument has resonance today in the 
way that an anti-intellectual attitude prevails within contemporary society and social work. For 
example, then Health Minister Jacqui Smith, speaking at the 2002 Community Care Live conference 
said that  social work ‘is a very practical job. It is about protecting people and changing their lives, 
not about being able to give a fluent and theoretical explanation of why they got into difficulties in 
the first place’ (Community Care, 2002, online). Indeed, the increasing managerialism within social 
work and the way in which the ‘worker-client’ relationship is increasingly characterised by control 
and supervision rather than care, on ‘doing the job’ within the remit of legislation, policy and 
organisational dictate without active intellectual reflection, on practice, rather than praxis has 
become a concern for some within the profession. Concerned that social work should not be defined 
by its function for the state but by its value base, Jones et al. (2004) exhort the profession to 
‘coalesce and organise around a shared vision of what a genuinely anti-oppressive social work might 
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be like’ (online). Social workers are urged to engage with the ‘resources of hope available in the new 
collective movements for an alternative, and better, world’, one based around core ‘anti-capitalist’ 
values, such as solidarity and liberty (ibid.). This is, in effect, a contemporary version of the early 
radical social work movement’s call to work both ‘In and Against the State’. 
It can also be argued that the popularity of ‘evidence based practice’ is an example of instrumental 
reason, as symptomatic of social work being reduced to ‘managing’ rather than eliminating social 
injustice. The focus is on what works as opposed to discussions about what is being done, why it is 
being done and whether it should be done or not. Evidence based practice eliminates the need for 
moral judgement and reflection; it does not require intellectual thought, just research. 
Social workers then need to adopt immanent critique and praxis if they are to be more than 
technicians heeding the calls of their employers. 
 
Critical Theory in the Contemporary Period 
The Frankfurt School’s thought had a pessimistic slant, something influenced by the experience of 
fascism and the loss of belief over the possibility of working-class emancipation. This saw a turn to 
culture as a focus for research and potential progressive social change. For the 1960s/70s generation 
of activists, who were also contending with the defeat of the revolutionary fervour of their own 
time, critical theory proved influential as they, in turn, began to focus on culture and identity more 
so than economics and working-class revolution.  
Given that there are various perspectives on the causes and solutions to humanity’s problems it 
should be no surprise that a range of at times overlapping and/or competing perspectives have 
developed. Often these have emerged in conjunction with the social movements of the day, such as 
feminist, anti-racist, disability and queer critiques of normative assumptions and related social 
oppression. In this respect, it would be more accurate to talk about critical theories than critical 
theory. However, they share a belief that social inquiry should be aimed at decreasing domination 
and increasing freedom. For many, there was a need to challenge unequal social relations through 
other means, often within the workplace and/or the mechanisms of the state, for example by 
legislative and social policy means. 
In what follows I wish to look at two contemporary tactics by which some attempt to challenge 
social inequality, namely anti-stigma campaigns in relation to mental ‘disorder’ and the 
embracement of vulnerability with a particular focus on disability. 
Horkheimer (and Adorno) were disillusioned with Enlightenment theories of reason and 
universalism. Reason, for them, leads to the destruction of the subject, with socially constructed 
inhibitions becoming part of individual consciousness. Horkheimer’s critique of reason lay in part on 
the correct observation that the abstract notion of universality and equality did not fit with a 
pluralistic and inegalitarian world.  
Such sentiments have become increasingly popular within contemporary ‘critical’ schools of thought. 
For example, many of the concerns of the earlier critical theorists are incorporated into critical 
disability studies with society’s privileging of rationality, autonomy and competence said to ‘other’ 
those subjects  who, for whatever reason, fail to live up to this ideal. Influenced by 
poststructuralism, such critics seek to destabilise binaries and fixed notions of what it means to be 
human. The idea of the human subject, a key component of liberal thought since the Enlightenment, 
is not only contested but stands accused of propagating oppressive social relations both at home 
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and across the globe. The Subject (with a capital S) is a burden of which we would be better relieved, 
as in actuality, such a Subject is invariably ‘man-white-western-male-adult-reasonable-heterosexual-
living in towns-speaking a standard language’ (quoted in Goodley, 2007, p.154).  For Goodley, this is 
inevitable as the humanist subject defines himself by what he excludes. 
Those who fail to meet this vision of the human are then classed as ‘other’, as less human, or non-
human. Within the field of critical disability studies biopedagogies are said to ‘serve to produce the 
archetypal (masculine, cisgender, white, non-disabled, middle class, straight) citizen and 
autonomous human subject under neoliberal capitalism. Those considered other to this limited 
conceptualisation of humanity are positioned to fail’ (Rice, et al., 2016, p.6). In other words, some of 
us are more human than others, and there are some who are excluded from the category altogether.  
Similarly, within the field of critical psychiatry, the distinction between madness and reason, normal 
and abnormal, illness and heath is called into question. For Derrida (YEAR), even supposedly more 
progressive attempts to write about madness ended up reinforcing the divide as such endeavours 
tended to be written from the perspective of reason. The classification and diagnosis of aspects of 
human experience as mental disorders is far from an exact science, and the medicalisation of 
distress is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. For radical critics such as Thomas Szasz, a 
psychiatrist himself, the very concept of mental illness is a myth, one that is used to control people 
who exhibit behaviours that we as a society cannot understand or tolerate (Szasz, 1961). The mind, 
like the economy, can only be sick in a metaphorical, not literal, sense.  
Once so labelled, it is also the case that a person’s status can change in ways that can undermine his 
humanity. Others may cease to see him/her as a person, with a history, desires and aspirations, but 
as ‘the schizophrenic’, the mad, as object rather than subject. The person becomes the patient and 
liable to lose many of the rights of citizenship that most people take for granted, such as the right to 
liberty unless convicted of a crime, and the right to refuse medical treatment even if doctors deem it 
to be in our best interest. Once given a psychiatric diagnosis, the now patient, subject to certain 
conditions being met, can be detained indefinitely under mental health legislation and given medical 
treatment against his or her will. In order to address some of these concerns several strategies have 
been proposed to alleviate discrimination and stigma and improve the rights of citizenship of those 
labelled as mentally ill or learning disabled. 
Challenging Stigma 
Within the arena of mental health, four broad models of anti-discrimination have been identified: 
the brain disease model; the libertarian model; the disability inclusion model; and the ‘continuum’, 
or individual growth model (Sayce, 2000). 
The brain disease model essentially sees mental illnesses as similar to other bodily diseases, with 
their roots in genetic and/or biochemical malfunction. Suffering from a mental illness then is not due 
to moral weakness, problematic family relationships or environmental factors but is located within 
the biological make-up of the individual sufferer. This perspective has found favour with many 
families, in part, because it absolves the family of any responsibility for the problems of the sufferer. 
However, this has to be seen in context as not only a rejection of familial influence and of the 
embracement of biomedical psychiatry, but also as a response to the Langian notion that family 
upbringing plays a large part in the development of future mental illness. Such was the strength of 
this idea in the 1970s that carers could find themselves castigated for ‘causing’ the schizophrenia of 
their offspring (see Sedgwick, 1982 for a good discussion and critique of this viewpoint). 
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For our purposes, the anti-stigma rationale of this approach is that if mental illness is a disease just 
like other bodily disease then no stigma should be attached to it. It is no fault of the individual that 
they are mentally ill, they are just unlucky. They are not to blame for their behaviour so should not 
be assigned any responsibility. However, if individuals are seen as not being in control of their 
actions then it follows that they need monitoring and controlling on the presumption that they lack 
judgement. In essence, the less responsibility you have means the fewer rights of citizenship you 
possess. However, as Sayce points out ‘A non-discriminatory position is one which recognises that 
mental disorder per se does not invalidate judgement. Many citizens make unwise decisions. 
User/survivors should not be expected to be any wiser than anyone else. Overruling someone’s 
decision – even when it seems, to well-motivated professionals, to be an unwise decision – must be 
heavily constrained. And if users commit crimes, it should not be assumed that it is not their fault’ 
(p.95). She goes on, ‘The “no-fault” brain disease model removes the moral taint of mental illness 
but raises new difficulties on numerous fronts. Allocating no fault, and no responsibility, is 
fundamentally problematic in terms of the sharing of rights and responsibilities necessary to 
citizenship’ (p.99). 
Advocates of the libertarian model demand equal civil rights and in return are willing to accept equal 
criminal responsibility. Mental health law allows people diagnosed as suffering from a mental 
disorder to be detained against their will, not necessarily on account of what they have done but on 
account of what professionals think they will do in future. A form of ‘pre-emptive strike’ if you will. 
Influenced by the writings of such as Szasz (1961), in essence the libertarian activists argue that they 
should be locked up for what they do, not what professionals think they will do. The libertarian 
movement has had a valuable role in highlighting the often coercive nature of mental health 
legislation but it also leads to situations where obviously incapacitated people, clearly ill and/or 
disabled without full responsibility for their actions, are treated within a punitive prison system 
rather than receiving the care that they require. Sayce (2000) gives the example of some libertarian 
extremists in the USA who refused to campaign to save a man with learning disabilities from 
execution on the grounds that he should accept full responsibility for his actions. For them, whilst his 
potential execution was  a tragedy, it was nothing compared to the deaths and forced incarceration 
of tens of thousands of psychiatric patients annually. 
The ‘disability inclusion model’ is the one that Sayce sees as having the most potential in realising 
increased citizenship rights for mental health users/survivors by challenging discrimination 
‘wherever it occurs, from the government committee report to the conversation in a bar’ (p.143). 
She views this model as being highly inclusive as ‘it can accommodate people seeking healing or 
cure, through any means from chanting to Prozac, but being “healed” or “in recovery” is quite 
unnecessary to be in this change movement, which explicitly values people whether they “recover” 
or not’ (p.143). It argues against attaching shame to mental health problems whilst, simultaneously, 
seeking to change attitudes and practices by use of such things as legislative changes and public 
awareness campaigns. 
All such perspectives have their strengths and weaknesses. However, from a 
theoretical/philosophical stance it is arguably the idea of the ‘continuum’ that has most advocates 
today. From this perspective, to understand mental health/distress it is necessary to view it as a 
continuum, with mental health at one end of the continuum and mental distress at the other. We 
are all placed somewhere on the continuum and we will all, at some point, move along it, for better 
or worse, in one direction or another. In other words, there is no rigid divide between mental health 
and mental illness; therefore, to classify some people as mentally ill sets up an ‘us and them’ 
situation, with ‘them’ being stigmatised and oppressed. The influence of postmodernism and 
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poststructuralism is clear here as these arguments do much more than merely disrupt the binaries of 
disabled/able-bodied, illness/health, they question the legitimacy of attempts at classification, the 
objects classified being seen as merely the effect of language. 
Such insights are extremely useful and serve to make us aware of the dangers of medicalising human 
experience; nevertheless there are many problems with the notion of mental health and illness as 
operating on a continuum. First, the continuum argument may be valid in the sense that all mental 
experiences involve the emotions and also that there is no rigid, ahistorical or apolitical dividing line 
between what gets classed as normal or abnormal; yesterday’s naughty child is today’s ADHD 
sufferer, the shy adult now has ‘avoidant personality disorder’. However, to conflate all emotional 
states as belonging on the same continuum, for example severe depression with life’s ups and 
downs, is as absurd as conflating a child’s sand pit with the Sahara desert; both may contain sand, 
but that is where the similarity ends. 
Another weakness in the continuum proponents’ case is that, in reality, there has to be boundary, 
however unstable and subject to change, between those who require professional intervention and 
those who do not. For example,  
even the most radical and progressive mental-health resource programmes, such as 
therapeutic communities and user/survivor asylum and support interventions, make 
assessments as to who should and who should not access their services. In other words, they 
operate eligibility criteria, making a distinction between people on the basis of their mental 
state. They may reject the medical model of classification and treatment, but they 
themselves classify and differentiate. Whatever model of mind is used to make the 
distinction, the end result is the same: the continuum is broken. 
(McLaughlin, 2011, online) 
 
There is also within this model a presumption of vulnerability within each of us. Whilst this is 
obviously true, it fails to see the political and historical specificity of the concept of vulnerability, 
which when viewed from a critical perspective casts doubt on the political gains to be made from the 
embracement of vulnerability. 
Uniting Critical perspectives: Radical Vulnerability4  
The utilisation of the concept of vulnerability is ubiquitous within UK social services and disciplinary 
systems of assessment for, and provision of, services, for example in the allocation/prioritisation of 
social housing, the protection of children, young people and many adults, and also plays a part 
within the criminal justice system. Such ubiquity can give the impression of a natural, ahistoric 
concept rather than a relatively recent framework for understanding both individual problems and 
social relations. Whilst not a new term it is one that has expanded in recent years to encompass ever 
more people within its reach. 
For some, the concept of vulnerability can be harnessed for progressive social and political purposes, 
becoming a platform for collective forms of action from which social justice can be achieved. 
Vulnerability, from this perspective, offers the opportunity for a reconceptualization of human 
relations in general (e.g. Brown 2010) and for specific groups such as the physically disabled or 
                                                          
4 I discuss these issues in more detail in McLaughlin, K. (2017) ‘Disabling the Subject: From radical vulnerability 
to vulnerable radicals’, Annual Review of Critical Psychology (any sections reproduced here are by permission). 
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people with learning disabilities in particular (e.g. Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2016). For Goodley, 
taking an affirmative approach to vulnerability,  
‘shifts us away from a humanist reliance on the independent sovereign self to a post-human 
celebration of interdependence. The vulnerable self depends upon others to live. Numerous 
disabled selves that are normatively understood as dependent are now recast as sources of 
interdependence. Disability, we might suggest, demands interdependency, thus inviting new ways of 
thinking about what it means to be a (post) human subject’ (Ecclestone and Goodley, 2016, p.180). 
 Others have highlighted problems with the way the discourse of vulnerability operates within 
modern society,  seeing the operation of the vulnerability discourse as paving the way to state 
paternalism (Furedi, 2004), reducing socio-political problems to psychoemotional ones (Wainwright 
and Calnan, 2002; Frawley, 2015) and representing a process of political stagnation and decline of a 
belief in wider social change (McLaughlin, 2012). The concept has also been critiqued in relation to 
particular areas such as education (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2008) and specific groups such as young 
people (Brown, 2015), disabled people (Oliver, 1990) and people with learning difficulties 
(Hollomotz, 2009). Vulnerability, then, has become a key component of contemporary sociological 
and political discourse, leading Brown (2015) to argue that we are living within a ‘vulnerability 
zeitgeist’. 
A belief in the innate vulnerability of certain people or groups can also lead to a patronising, 
protective attitude towards them that can undermine their rights and deny them agency. Such a 
discourse acts to single out and ‘other’ certain groups in ways that can be controlling, stigmatising 
and oppressive (Brown, 2015). 
In recognition of this, many disabled theorists and activists choose not to challenge the presumption 
of vulnerability, but rather to embrace it and seek to expand the category by emphasising that 
vulnerability is an inevitable part of the human condition (e.g. Oliver and Sapey, 2006; Fineman, 
2010). In doing so, the intention is to highlight the ways in which we are all vulnerable, some more 
so than others, some for longer than others, but nevertheless, vulnerability is a human universal. In 
addition, it is pointed out that to cope with life we all require the help and support of others, 
whether that is in the form of such things as social organisation, emotional connection or healthcare. 
From this perspective, acknowledging, embracing, celebrating even, our common vulnerability, can 
play a part in fostering a more tolerant and inclusive society, as well as a more socially just welfare 
state as a counter to the current neo-liberal one. 
For such writers the aim is to  
‘depathologise official categories by recasting vulnerability as a progressive attribute of a 
relational citizenship, integral to the “fragile and contingent nature of personhood” where 
we are all “potentially vulnerable” and where vulnerability is a “universal” ontolological 
dimension of human experience and identity’. 
 (Ecclestone and Goodley, 2016, p.177).  
Such an approach, it is hoped, will allow people to be protected from any detrimental effects of 
potential vulnerabilities and also from pathologising and intrusive state-sponsored interventions, 
whilst simultaneously allowing those with current actual vulnerabilities to be supported according to 
their specific situation and associated needs. 
From these perspectives, collective and specific vulnerabilities are presented as a potential source of 
political mobilisation, for example by highlighting the suffering caused by contemporary social, 
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economic and political relations. Vulnerability is here utilised for anti-capitalist and social reformist 
purposes. For example, Butler links notions of vulnerability to that of precarity as a vehicle to 
combat oppression: ‘precariousness [is] a function of our social vulnerability and exposure that is 
always given some political form, and precarity as differentially distributed [is] one important 
dimension of the unequal distribution of conditions required for continued life’ (quoted in 
Ecclestone and Goodley, 2016, p.178). In a similar vein to standpoint theory, where the oppressed 
are said to have a better understanding of the reality of social conditions than the rulers, precarity 
and vulnerability can awaken us to the problems of the age. 
Analyses of vulnerability often acknowledge that like risk and fear it is primarily a subjective, not 
objective phenomenon. However, for Ahmed (2014), what is relatively unconsidered is the question 
of ‘why some bodies are more afraid than others? How do feelings of vulnerability take shape?’ 
(p.68). Ahmed notes that whilst fear may be experienced individually it is ‘structural and mediated, 
rather than an immediate bodily response to an objective danger’ (p.69), and hence such feelings of 
vulnerability ‘shape women’s bodies as well as how those bodies inhabit space’ (ibid. p.70).  
However, if feelings of vulnerability are structured and mediated, they are also historically specific in 
relation to how they are experienced, conceptualised and strategized, both in relation to how to 
improve both individual feelings and the social conditions from within which they arise. For example, 
the rise of ‘work stress’ was, to a large degree, a result of trade unions recasting problematic 
workplace relations in the language of individual vulnerability, the change in focus being due to the 
weakening of older more collective responses, such as industrial action, to such issues (Wainwright 
and Calnan, 2002). The rise of the ‘survivor identity’ in recent years has also been influenced by the 
changing nature of both individual and group demands for recognition of individual vulnerability 
rather than collective strength (McLaughlin, 2012). 
The main contribution of the continuum model’s advocates is the way in which they highlight the 
historical construction of contemporary psychiatric/disability theory, diagnosis and practice, 
including the role of politics and social change in our understanding of the causes of, and attempts 
to alleviate, mental distress. However, their main weakness is a failure fully to appreciate the impact 
of such factors on the current mental-health debate. If the traditional concept of mental illness 
arose due to the interplay of wider social phenomena, so too did the current trend to view us all as 
on a continuum and in need of therapeutic help to maintain our equilibrium. In other words, their 
historical analyses fail to adequately analyse the present historical epoch. 
 
Conclusion: Considerations for Critical Social Work  
Within social work the term critical theory is used to cover a range of perspectives. For example, 
Healey (2001) uses the term critical social work to refer to a broad range of practice theories that 
share the following orientations: 
‘a recognition that large scale social processes, particularly those associated with class, race 
and gender, contribute fundamentally to the personal and social issues social workers 
encounter in their practice; the adoption of a self-reflexive and critical stance to the often 
contradictory effects of social work practice and social policies; a commitment to co-
participatory rather than authoritarian practice relations. This involves workers and service 
users, as a well as academic, practitioners and service users as co-participants engaged with, 
but still distinct from, one another; working with and for oppressed populations to achieve 
social transformation’ (online).  
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Aspects of such a definition have been discussed above in relation to some popular trends within 
critical intellectual thought. By way of a conclusion I wish to detail some of the implications for social 
work that give rise to, and hopefully, generate a discussion and gain views from practice as to how 
these are wrestled with in the intensity of frontline practice. 
The anti-stigma models discussed above need to be considered by social work practitioners. At times 
a flexible approach will be necessary. For example, the libertarian approach is commendable in 
allowing clients the freedom to make their own mistakes and alerts us to the dangers of an 
authoritarian, risk-averse form of practice. The latter can be seen in the overuse of Community 
Treatment Orders which, it has been argued, are more about protecting professionals than patients; 
the professionals covering their backs in case something goes wrong post-discharge (McLaughlin and 
Cordell, 2013). However, it is the case that at times intervention is necessary against the wishes of 
the patient. Social workers have to balance this predicament. It is not an easy one, but that is a good 
thing. We should never lose sight of the importance of the power we have over many vulnerable 
people and any such decision should not be taken without careful consideration of all relevant 
factors. The brain disease model, whilst oft-criticised as medicalisation, also needs to be considered 
in that we will often be arguing that, for a variety of reasons, such as mental or intellectual 
incapacity, that individuals are not fully responsible for their actions. We do not want to go to the 
extreme of prosecuting or imprisoning those who are not, or were not at the time, in full control of 
their faculties. The disability inclusion model can allow the law and campaigns to address instances 
of discrimination. Social workers are well placed here given their statutory powers. However, 
debates over what we mean by ‘inclusion’ are important, as it is possible that it becomes a byword 
for tokenism. The continuum and vulnerability models alert us to the fluid nature of the human 
condition and the dangers of objectifying others. However, we should not be afraid to differentiate 
between those who need help and those who do not. Viewing everyone as vulnerable and mental 
health as a continuum does not necessarily help those who do require professional intervention. 
Also, for those who see state oppression as problematic, it is difficult to see how emphasising our 
vulnerability and mental weakness will change the wider social structures and power base. 
This chapter has sought to give readers an introduction to some common critical perspectives and to 
highlight the overlaps and tensions between them. For social workers, the contradictions and 
tension within the role will have already been all too clear to them as they go about their daily work. 
However, I hope I have helped to give them some more context to the dilemmas they have to 
consider as they attempt what is at times a careful balancing act between various political and 
philosophical perspectives. 
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